UIC Law Review
Volume 21

Issue 1

Article 7

Fall 1987

Helping Those Who Help the Sojourner among Us: Viable
Defenses for Members of the Sanctuary Movement, 21 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 135 (1987)
Barbara A. Sherry

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons,
International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace
Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Barbara A. Sherry, Helping Those Who Help the Sojourner among Us: Viable Defenses for Members of the
Sanctuary Movement, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 135 (1987)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/7
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

HELPING THOSE WHO HELP THE SOJOURNER
AMONG US: VIABLE DEFENSES FOR MEMBERS
1
OF THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
Ramon and Mercedes Sanchez lived in El Salvador. They
watched while their country's soldiers kidnapped, raped, mutilated,
and murdered their two daughters. Seeking a new life, Ramon and
Mercedes fled El Salvador for the United States of America. They
applied for asylum. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) concluded that the Sanchezes had not presented written proof
showing why their daughters had been killed. For that reason, the
INS denied Ramon and Mercedes asylum.2
The plight of the Sanchez family reoccurs daily. Aliens from El
Salvador, fleeing the civil war in their homeland, enter the United
States at the rate of several thousand per month.' INS estimates
that it apprehends only about one-quarter of these 4,000
Salvadorans who enter monthly.4 Many of those who have entered,
like the Sanchez family, have attempted to remain legally in the
United States; yet this country's immigration and asylum policy has
frustrated the hopes of most of these people.'
Although the system has been unresponsive to the plight of Salvadoran refugees, the American people have become increasingly
aware of the lives of people like the Sanchez family. This awareness
is due both to the extensive documentation on conditions in El Salvador6 and to the realization that the law of one's conscience may be
1. Numbers 35:15 (King James) ("[tihese six cities shall be a refuge, both for
the children of Israel, and for the stranger, and for the sojourner among them
.
"). The
..
title of this Comment reflects the biblical roots of the concept of
sanctuary. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of these roots.

2. See R. GOLDEN
13 (1986).

& M. MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAIL-

ROAD

3. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU PUBLIC
SALVADORANS IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (Dec. 1983).

POLICY REPORT No.

1,

4. See Comment, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in
the United States, 47 U. PIr. L. REV. 295 n.1 (1985).
5. From October 1983 until September 1984, only 328 out of 13,373 Salvadoran
asylum requests were granted. See Note, Membership in a Social Group: Salvadoran
Refugees and the 1980 Refugee Act, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 305, 330
(1985) [hereinafter Membership].

6. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., STATE DEPT. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985 515-33 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter COUNTRY RE(reflects belief that situation in El Salvador is improving, but cites numerous
human rights problems); Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1984/25
PORTS]
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superior to the law of one's land.7 The Sanctuary Movement is one
form this awareness has taken. This movement, consisting of people
of different faiths and political persuasions,8 seeks to provide a sanctuary-a safe haven-for illegal Salvadorans in the United States.
To date, the Sanctuary Movement has been the target of two major
government prosecutions.9 In both of these, the individual defendants have emerged as losers. The movement, however, has continued
to thrive.
This comment seeks to determine which defenses are viable for
sanctuary workers who are charged with violating United States immigration policy. First, this comment examines the current situation
in El Salvador. Next, a history of the Sanctuary Movement is
presented. This comment subsequently analyzes three viable defenses"0 which sanctuary workers may utilize: first, United States vi(1984) [hereinafter Final Report] (investigation of murders, abductions, disappearances, terrorist acts, and violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms taking
place in El Salvador); AMERICAS WATCH, HELSINKI WATCH, & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

FAILURE:

THE REAGAN

ADMINISTRATION'S

HUMAN

RIGHTS POLICY IN 1983 (1984) [hereinafter FAILURE] (extremely critical' report of
United States policy towards El Salvador that describes human rights situation there
as disastrous).
7. Sanctuary workers are part of a long tradition of civil disobedience in the
United States. Henry David Thoreau was perhaps the most well-known proponent of
the proposition that a government that does not conduct itself in a moral manner
need not be obeyed. Rather than pay a poll tax and thus participate in the evil of
slavery, Thoreau went to jail. He defended his action, stating that "[ulnder a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison." 10
H.D. THOREAU, THE WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 152 (1894). See generally
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA (D. Weber ed. 1978) (extensive treatment of the history of civil disobedience in the United States, with a lengthy section on opposition to
slavery).- The late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. defined the doctrine of civil disobedience by stating: "[O]ne has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws." M. L.
KING, JR., Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 84 (1963). See also
Cities Can't Make Immigration Law, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 1, 1986, at 4, col. 1 (applying
King's ideas to the Sanctuary Movement).
8. Religious groups supporting the movement include American Baptists,
Church of the Brethren, three Lutheran Synods, Presbyterians, Quakers, United
Church of Christ, Unitarians, the United Methodist Church, and the National Council of Conservative Rabbis. See Witt, On the Line, Chicago Tribune, May 5, 1985,
Magazine, at 20; Ridgeway, Refugees Aren't the Targets of Sanctuary Movement
Crackdown, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 4, col. 3. In addition, while the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops has not officially endorsed the movement, some individual Roman Catholic bishops, including Milwaukee, Wis., Archbishop Rembert
Weakland have joined the movement. Goldman, Whose Law Governs Sanctuary for
Illegal Aliens?, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 27, 1985, at 4, col. 3. Weakland has said that
"[slanctuary is not really a way of avoiding justice, but a holy respite so that true
justice can eventually be done." Id. Sanctuary churches exist throughout the United
States, in such diverse locations as Champaign-Urbana, Ill., New York City, and Tucson, Ariz. Witt, supra, at 22.
9. See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of these prosecutions in Texas and Arizona.
10. The only defenses discussed in this Comment are United States violation of
international law, the doctrine of necessity, and the free exercise of religion, although
other defenses exist. These other defenses include the fact that sanctuary workers
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olation of international law; second, the doctrine of necessity; and
third, free exercise of religion. Through the use of these defenses, an
individual sanctuary defendant may ensure not only that he or she
may prevail, but that the goals of the movement will be broadcast to
the American people.
I.

CURRENT CONDITIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND THE UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES' RESPONSE

Since 1979, a brutal civil war has raged in El Salvador." Americas Watch, a human rights organization, described the situation in
El Salvador as an "unabated horror."'" More than 60,000 Salvadorans out of a population of 5.2 million have died. 3 Death squads
routinely murder dissenters of the current government without fear
of repercussion. 4 Civilian disappearances, indiscriminate bombings,
abductions, torture, and arbitrary arrests occur with sickening frequency. 5 In addition, the civil war has displaced approximately
500,000 Salvadorans-one-tenth of the country's population."6
The United Nations has repeatedly expressed concern for the
current situation in El Salvador and for the problems of Salvadoran
refugees.' 7 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
lack the specific intent necessary to violate the anti-smuggling statute and the defense of duress. See Comment, Ecumencial, Municipal and Legal Challenges to
United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 493 (1986).

11. This war pits the government forces against the leftist Farabundo Marti
Liberation Front (FMLN) forces. See Schodolski & Rowley, SalvadoranPeace Just a
Cry in Wilderness, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, at 14, col. 1. Although two
rounds of peace talks between the two sides were held in October 1984 and November
1984, the scheduled third round of talks in September 1986 never occurred. Id. This
failure has led some to suggest that the civil war could go on into the next century.
Id. If this occurs, the current refugee exodus from El Salvador, which is already
greater than the refugee flight from Indochina, will be a mere portend of the future
numbers to come. See Central American Refugees' Plight Described, REFUGEES, May
1984, at 38.
12. FAILURE, supra note 6, at 32. Americas Watch, along with Amnesty International, has published numerous reports on the situation of civil strife in El Salvador,
and of the concurrent refugee dilemma.
13. Schodolski & Rowley, supra note 11, at 14.
14. In the first nine months of 1983, the number of people murdered was 3,904,
according to the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador. Final Report, supra note
6, at 14.
15. Id. at 20. In the first three months of 1983 alone, 75 cases of physical torture
were documented, 18 cases of decapitation in the central zone of El Salvador were
reported, and 10 cases of women raped and then murdered were reported. Id.
16. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS & AMERICAS
WATCH, EL SALVADOR'S OTHER VICTIMS: THE WAR ON THE DISPLACED 12 (1984). See
generally A Long Journey to Find a Safe Place, REFUGEES, May 1983, at 7 (report of
refugees' trek from El Salvador to Honduras); Honduras: A Short Walk Along the
Border, REFUGEES, Mar. 1985, at 17 (description of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights' roving protection officers in Honduras and how they assist refugees from El Salvador).
17. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 35/192, 35 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. A/
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(UNHCR) has adopted resolutions on the violation of human rights
in El Salvador.18 Furthermore, it has stated that no governmentincluding the United States government-should return Salvadoran
refugees, either directly or indirectly, to El Salvador.19
Regardless of United Nations' pronouncements concerning the
intolerable conditions in El Salvador, the United States considers El
Salvador a key ally. The United States continues to provide financial support to El Salvador."0 Although the United States supports
the current Salvadoran government over the rebel forces, the United
States itself has recognized substantial human rights abuses in El

Salvador. 2 In February 1986, the State Department stated that government forces were still murdering civilians."2 Despite ample docu-

mentation of serious human rights abuses in El Salvador, and despite agreement by the United States government that such abuses
do exist, United States immigration policy toward Salvadorans remains cautious.2 3 The probability persists, therefore, that atrocities
such as the one the Sanchez family endired will continue.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) and the
Res/35/192 (1980); G.A. Res. 36/155, 36 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. A/
Res/36/155 (1981).
18. The United Nations first adopted a resolution in 1980, expressing concern
at the "grave violations" of human rights in El Salvador. G.A. Res. 35/192, 35 U.N.
GAOR (Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. A/Res/35/192 (1980). The 1983 resolution "expressed its deep concern" at numerous reports of government bombing of civilian
areas. G.A. Res. 38/101, 38 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. A/Res/38/101
91984).
19. Membership, supra note 5, at 328 n.169 (quoting letter from UNHCR Legal
Advisor).
20. In 1985, the United States provided El Salvador with 518.5 million dollars
in aid. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury: A Government's Weapon
Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 29 (1986) (quoting Duarte:
Prisonerof War, ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS, reprintedin NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS OF LATIN AMERICAN (NACLA), REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 14-20 (Jan./Mar
1986)).
21. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 6, at 533.
22. Id. at 516. This report goes on to state that arrests can be made by Salvadoran security forces without a warrant, that the courts are hampered by judges' and
juries' susceptibility to bribes and intimidation, that the government uses "networks
of informers," and that security forces use forced entries in arresting and investigating civilians. Id. at 521-24.
23. The number of Salvadorans in the United States illegally has been estimated at 300,000 to 500,000. H.R. REP. No. 1142, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 10
(1984). See also "Sanctuary" Movement Stirs Passionate Debate, REFUGEES, Nov.
1985, at 29 (statistics of Salvadoran immigration, legal and illegal, into the United
States). The INS, however, has routinely denied Salvadorans asylum status. In 1984,
only 328 out of 13,373 Salvadoran requests for asylum were granted. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Report, reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. at 827-31
(daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982). This is a success rate of two percent. In comparison, the
average success rate for asylum requests from aliens from all countries is 20%, and
the success rate for aliens from the Soviet Union is 78%. For a graphic view of this,
see the following chart.
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Refugee Act of 1980 govern asylum law in the United States.2 4 An
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See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 253 (1984) (addresses the failure of the Reagan Administration to follow the 1980 Refugee Act and proposes to depoliticize the asylum process);
Korn, Hiding in the Open, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1986, at 24, 26 (discusses Sanctuary
Movement trial in Tucson, Ariz.). If a person is from a Communist country, or from a
country not allied with the United States, he or she has a far easier task obtaining
refuge or asylum. See Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. InternationalObligations?,43 MD.
L. REV. 91, 120 (1986); Note, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution"in
United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187, 203-04 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Need for a Codified Definition]. Unfortunately, for people like the Sanchez family, El
Salvador is a non-Communist United States ally.
24. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The congressional policy and
objectives behind the Refugee Act of 1980 are stated in it:
(a) the Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to
respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance for their care
and maintenance in asylum areas, efforts to promote opportunities for resettlement or voluntary repatriation, aid for necessary transportation and
processing, admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian
concern to the United States, and transitional assistance to refugees in the
United States. The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the
United States to encourage all nations to provide assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest extent possible.
(b) The objectives of this Act [see Short Title of 1980 Amendment note set
out under section 1101 of this title] are to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special hu-
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alien may be eligible for asylum, or qualify as a refugee, under two
sections of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. First,
section 243(h) provides that the United States Attorney General
may not deport any alien to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, nationality, political
opinion, religion, or membership in a specific social group."' The
United States Supreme Court has held that in order for an alien to
qualify for this withholding of deportation, he or she must demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution." 6
Second, section 208(a) of the INA provides that the Attorney
General has the discretion to grant asylum to aliens meeting the definition of "refugees."2 7 Under this section, a refugee may qualify for
asylum by showing a "well-founded fear of persecution." 8 The Supreme Court recently held that this standard is something less than
"more likely than not" that the alien will be persecuted for one of
the five specified reasons.29 Aliens' attempts to obtain either asylum
under section 208(a) or withholding of deportation under section
243(h) have been generally unsuccessful.30 As a direct result of this
manitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and
uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.
8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1982).
25. Section 243(h) states: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any
alien . . . if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would
be threatened . . . on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INA § 243(h)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
26. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984). The Court held that the question to
be asked under the clear probability standard is "whether it is more likely than not
that the alien would be subject to persecution." Id.
27. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, Title II, § 208 (a), 94 Stat. 102, 105
(1980)(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. 1985)). A refugee is defined as follows:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 92-212, Title II, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102-03.
28. The "well-founded fear of persecution" standard is more generous than the
"clear probability of persecution" standard. See Stevic, 407 U.S. at 425; Yousif v.
INS, 795 F.2d 236, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1986); Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th
Cir. 1984). The well-founded fear standard is easier to meet because it "can be satisfied by credible subjective evidence and . . . the fear may be based upon group characteristics such as the petitioner's religion." Dolores v. INS, 772 F.2d 223, 226 (6th
Cir. 1985). A request for asylum made under § 208(a) is also considered a request
under § 243(h). Id. at 423 n.18. A § 243(h) request is not, however, automatically
construed as a § 208(a) request. Id.
29. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1212 (1987). The Court declined to
define a precise standard, but stated that a "moderate interpretation" of the standard
would indicate that when persecution is a "reasonable possibility," as established by
an objective situation, the standard is met. Id. at 1217-18.
30. See, e.g., Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986) (upheld Bureau

1987]

Sanctuary Movement

dismal success record, the Sanctuary Movement has emerged as an
alternative to working within the system.
II.

THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT

A. Roots of the Movement
The idea of sanctuary originated in biblical times. Six cities of
refuge provided safe haven to people who had accidentally killed
others, and as a result, were being chased in vengeance.31 In the
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determination that illegal Salvadoran not entitled to
asylum under either § -208(a) or § 243(h)); Florez-de Solis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330 (9th
Cir. 1986)(affirmed BIA decision to deport Salvadoran not entitled to asylum under
either section of INA); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985)(Salvadoran's
deportation upheld although he had been kidnapped and beaten); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1985) (deportation of Salvadoran upheld
even though he was former army officer and right-wing party member who had been
recruited by guerillas to infiltrate government); Zepeda-Melendez v INS, 741 F.2d
285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984) (deportation of Salvadoran who had been recruited by guerillas upheld); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (BIA did not abuse its
discretion in saying Salvadoran, who had been threatened because he was armed security guard, did not establish prima facie case that his fear of being singled out for
persecution was well-founded); Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th
Cir. 1982) (widespread and tragic danger affecting all in El Salvador is not persecution under § 243(h)); Villegas V. O'Neill, 626 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(Salvadoran's fear of persecution for deserting military is not fear of persecution that
qualified him for political asylum). But see Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 56567 (9th Cir. 1984) (BIA's decision to deny Salvadoran's political asylum application
under § 243(h) not supported by substantial evidence).
The major obstacle to be hurdled by those seeking refugee status or asylum is
that they must present evidence that they have been, or will be, singled out for persecution. See Note, Need for a Codified Definition, supra note 23, at 202-05. This barrier is often insurmountable. See R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 45
(noting that the UNHCR had concluded that there appeared to be "a systematic
practice designed to secure the return of Salvadorans"). This approach was recently
criticized:
Many of our fellow human beings live and die in a world where governments
are more brutal than ours and less accustomed to documenting their misconduct; in considering evidence of how governments operate in that world, we
ought not to jump to the assumption that what they have not documented
they have not done.
Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1986).
31. Biblical passages relied upon by sanctuary members include:
He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death. And if a
man lye not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand, then I will appoint
thee a place wither he shall flee.
Exodus 21: 12-13;
Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for yee know the heart of a stranger,
seeing yee were strangers in the land of Egypt.
Exodus 23:9;
And among the cities which yee shall give unto the Levites, there shall be six
cities for refuge, which yee shall appoint for the manslayer, that he may flee
thither.
Numbers 35:6;
And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying Speak unto the children of Israel, and
say unto them, When ye be come over Jordan, into the land of Canaan: Then
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fourth century, the Romans recognized Christian churches as sanctuaries."2 This concept of the church as a place of refuge reappeared
in English law, which provided that a person accused of a felony
could take refuge in a church for up to forty days."
In the United States, the Underground Railroad of pre-Civil
War times was in many ways similar to the Sanctuary Movement.
The Underground Railroad consisted of people who helped slaves
flee the South and find freedom in the northern states and in Canada. 4 Many people defied the Fugitive Slave Act,35 and often used
churches as stops on the Underground Railroad flights.3 "
The theory of sanctuary moved from the Civil War era into the
twentieth century during the Vietnam War. Those evading the draft
and those deserting the military found refuge in churches on a number of occasions.3 7 Just as those in opposition to the Fugitive Slave
Act signed public pledges of their intent to violate the law," modern-day churches and congregations have designated themselves as
sanctuaries.39
ye shall appoint you cities, to be cities of refuge for you; that the slayer may
flee thither which killeth any person at unawares. And they shall be unto you
cities for refuge from the avenger, that the manslayer die not.
Numbers 35:9-12;
Then Peter and the other apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God
rather than men.
Acts. 5:29.
32. See Goldman, supra note 8, at 4.
33. Id. Cf. Pryce, Ecclesiastical Sanctuary in Thirteenth-Century Welsh Law,
5 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1984) (addresses inviolability of church sanctuaries and secular
legitimation of churches' sanctuary rights). This privilege was eventually abolished by
James I. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 326-27.
34. See V. HARDING, THERE Is A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN
AMERICA

(1981).

35. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 provided that all citizens were required to
aid in the pursuit of a slave when ordered to do so by commissioners who were appointed by the federal courts. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. Those
who obstructed another person who was in the process of seizing a slave, or those who
rescued or harbored slaves, were subject to a $1000 fine and six-month imprisonment.
See T.D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 17801861 145-46 (1974).
36. See S.W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE
SLAVE LAW,

1850-1860 (1970).

37. In 1968, a convicted draft evader sought refuge in a Boston church. Federal
marshals carried him away from the altar. See Goldman, supra note 8,at 4.
38. One such pledge read:
Whereas the late act of Congress makes a refusal to aid in the capture of a
fugitive a penal offense the subscribers being restrained by conscientious motives from rendering any active obedience to the law, do solemnly pledge ourselves to each other, rather to submit to its penalties, than to obey its
provisions.
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL: ITS HISTORY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY Appendix, 21

(1850).
39. One of the leaders of the movement, John Fife, is a minister whose Tucson,
Arizona, congregation voted to declare its church a sanctuary. Fife sent a letter to the
Attorney General, stating that the participants took the action because "justice and
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The concept of establishing a place of refuge to help those fleeing extreme hardship is therefore firmly grounded historically. It reflects this country's ongoing policy of helping those who seek refuge
from oppression.
B.

The Sanctuary Movement Today

At present, hundreds of churches and thousands of individuals
are involved in the Sanctuary Movement.4 Yet, a small group of
individuals formed this modern-day version of the Underground
Railroad. Jim Corbett, a Quaker, along with John Fife, a Presbyterian minister, assembled a group of people concerned about Central
American refugees and declared Fife's church in Tucson, Arizona, a
sanctuary.41 The Sanctuary Movement soon blossomed, and now
counts among its supporters the National Council of Churches, the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the American Lutheran Church, the
American Baptist Churches, some individual Roman Catholic parishes and bishops, and the Rabbinical Assembly.42 In addition, numerous state and local governments have declared themselves to be
48
in support of the Sanctuary Movement.
From the beginning of the movement, sanctuary members declared that they were violating United States' laws. As a result, confrontation with the government was inevitable. Two such confrontations have occurred to date. The first episode occurred in Texas and
centered around the Casa Oscar Romero, a refugee center. 4 A lay
worker, Stacey Lynn Merkt, was convicted of aiding and abetting
mercy require that people of conscience actively assert our God-given right to aid
anyone fleeing from persecution and murder." Korn, supra note 25, at 28.
40. See, e.g., Sanctuary on Trial in Tucson, CONVERGENCE, Fall 1985, at 1 (report from the Christic Institute, a non-profit public-interest law center which helped
represent the defendants in the Tucson, Arizona sanctuary trial); Sanctuary: A Complex Case, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 4, col. 1 (editorial focusing on government
infiltration of sanctuary churches). As of January 1987, 370 congregations, 70,000
sanctuary workers, 2 sanctuary states, 19 sanctuary cities, and 20 sanctuary universi-

ties exist. Kemper, Convicted of the Gospel, SOJOURNER,

JULY

1986.

AT

14.

41. Corbett, a Quaker rancher, lives in Arizona. He became interested in the
plight of Salvadoran aliens after a friend of his picked up a Salvadoran hitchhiker
whom the border patrol soon seized. See generally Witt, supra note 8, at 20 (Corbett's influence on the Sanctuary Movement, and its history). Fife's church was the
first to be declared a sanctuary. Id.
42. See Korn, supra note 23, at 27.
43. State and local government actions which pertain to sanctuary include executive orders in Chicago and Massachusetts; a proclamation in New Mexico; and resolutions in San Francisco, Cal., New York City, Cambridge, Mass., Duluth, Minn., and
Madison, Wis. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 30 1986, at A23, col. 1.; Holding Out False
Hope, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 1, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
44. The center, named in honor of the assassinated Catholic Archbishop of El
Salvador, provides help to Salvadorans who have entered the United States. The
Catholic diocese of Brownsville, Texas donated the land on which the center was
built. See United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
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the unlawful transportation of undocumented aliens, in violation of
a federal immigration statute."' She received a ninety-day suspended sentence and two years of probation."6 Casa Oscar Romero's
Director, Jack Elder, was arrested in March 1984, but was acquitted
of violating the same statute. 7 In December 1984, Elder and Merkt
were both arrested for the second time, and Elder was convicted of
conspiracy in bringing in and landing illegal aliens and of transporting illegal aliens.48 Merkt was convicted of conspiracy, but her conviction was reversed and remanded in June 1985."1
In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit specifically addressed the defendants' claims that their actions were protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution and under instruments of international law. The court found no
merit in either of these defenses.60
The second confrontation between the government and sanctuary workers occurred in Arizona, at the movement's origin. In January 1985, sixteen people, including Jim Corbett, Reverend John Fife,
45. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at A16, col. 6. The statute under which Merkt
was convicted provided:
Any person who - (1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means
of transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to
bring into or land in the United States, by any means of transportation or
otherwise; (2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law...
transports or moves ... in furtherance of such violation of law; (3) willfully or
knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal,
harbor, or shield from detection, in any place, including any building or any
means of transportation; or (4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or
attempts to encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into
the United States of any alien shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1982). This statute was amended by the Immigration Reform &
Control Act of 1986, S. Res. 1200, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112.
46. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at A16, col. 6.
47. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (Elder's motion
to dismiss denied).
48. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A20, col. 1.; N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at
A12, col. 6.
49. The reversal was based on an erroneous jury charge. United States v. Merkt,
764 F.2d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 1985). The court found that the jury should have been
instructed to the effect that "li]f the jury should find as a fact that Merkt intended to
present the aliens to the proper officials so that they could seek legal status in this
country, it should find that she did not have the requisite minimal intent necessary
for a conviction under § 1324." Id. Merkt argued that she was unable to drive the
Salvadoran refugees to the nearest INS office because that office refused to accept
asylum applications from any Salvadoran refugees. Id. See Sanctuary on Trial in
Tucson, supra note 40, at 6.
50. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 273; Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1576-81. This confrontation
between the Texas sanctuary workers and the INS had some victories for the sanctuary workers, but not as a result of utilizing the freedom of religion defense or the
violation of international law defense. Of the six cases involved in the Texas prosecutions, only one person was sentenced to incarceration. See Colbert, supra note 20, at
46 n.216.
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priests, nuns, and lay workers, were indicted on seventy-one counts
of violating the criminal harboring and transporting statute.5 ' The
government obtained evidence against those indicted through the
52
use of informers and tape recordings.
In this case, United States v. Aguilar,5 3 the trial court judge
refused to allow the jury to hear evidence concerning international
law arguments or freedom of religion arguments.5 4 Six of the defendants were convicted of violating the criminal harboring and transporting statute. 55
As a result of these confrontations between church and state,
and in anticipation of more confrontations, two lawsuits were filed
against the United States government. In May 1985, over seventy
religious groups that supported the Sanctuary Movement filed suit
against Attorney General Edwin Meese seeking to bar new prosecutions of sanctuary members." The suit also sought an injunction to
prohibit the INS from deporting Central American refugees until
civil war and human rights violations in the refugees' countries of
origin cease. 7 In the other lawsuit, the churches which the government infiltrated in Aguilar, along with their national organizations,
sued the United States, alleging violations of their first, fourth, and
fifth amendment rights."
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). Only 11 of the defendants were actually tried.
Charges against two of those originally indicted were dismissed. Hawley, U.S.,
"Higher" Laws Clash in "Simple" Sanctuary Trial, Arizona Republic, Feb. 13, 1985,
at Al, 14, col. 6. In addition, three defendants pled guilty to misdemeanor charges.
Id.
52. The arrests of the sanctuary workers grew out of a nine-month INS investigation, Operation Sojourner. Pacelle, Santuary Jurors Dilemma: Law or Justice, 8
AM. LAW., Sept. 1986, at 95, 96. The investigation consisted primarily of government
informants who secretly infiltrated sanctuary groups and recorded 91 tapes of church
meetings. Id. See also Blodgett, Alien Search, 72 A.B.A. J. 31 (Apr. 1986) (churches
that were spied upon sued the federal government); The Sanctuary Case, L.A. Daily
J., Oct. 30, 1985, at 4, col. 1 (editorial contending that infiltration of the churches was
not necessary for the government to make its case).
53. United States v. Aguilar, No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz, 1985).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, No. C-85-3255 RFP
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
57. Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
recently denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first amendment claim for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.
58. The Presbyterian Church v. United States, No. CIV 86-0072-PHX-CLH (D.
Ariz. 1986), cited in Blodgett, Alien Search, supra note 52. The suit alleges that the
government, the Justice Department, and the INS violated the first amendment right
to free exercise of religion, the fourth amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure, and the fifth amendment right to due process of law. Id.
In addition, a committee composed of those who represent refugees sued Attorney General Meese and the INS Commissioner. Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v.
INS, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986). In that case, the court concluded that transporting aliens to detention centers outside of the area in which they were living did not
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The Sanctuary Movement, therefore, is a continuation of a centuries-old concept. Since its modern version began in Arizona and
Texas, it has grown considerably, attracting a diverse group of supporters, all eager to lend a hand to help people like the Sanchez
family.
III.

VIABLE DEFENSES SANCTUARY WORKERS MAY ASSERT

A.

United States Violation of InternationalLaw

Santuary workers contend that their actions on behalf of Salvadoran aliens are justified because the United States refuses to abide
by international law.59 Conversely, the workers contend that their
own actions comply with international law.s0 According to sanctuary
proponents, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees"1 (the Convention) provides Salvadorans with a right to
remain in the United States." The United States is bound to comply with the Convention." The Convention defines a refugee as one
who is outside the country of his nationality, and has a "wellfounded fear of being persecuted" for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
deprive them of any privilege or due process right. Id.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
60. Id.
61. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened
for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, provides that those who were refugees
prior to January 1, 1951, were entitled to protection from signatory countries to the
Convention. In 1967, the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
signed Jan. 21, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 was promulgated. The United
States ratified the Protocol in 1968, and because it incorporates Articles 2-34 of the
Convention, the United States is bound by both documents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (1965). The Protocol eliminated the time restrictions inherent in the Convention. See generally Nanda, World
Refugee Assistance: The Role of InternationalLaw and Institutions, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 449 (1981) (overview of international legal instruments, particularly United Nations documents); Nayar, The Right of Asylum in InternationalLaw: Its Status and
Prospects,17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 17 (1972) (extent to which the right to asylum is recognized in international relations).
62. The right to asylum is recognized by most countries in the world. See, e.g.,
CONST. preamble (France) and CONST. preamble (France 1946) ([alnyone persecuted
because of his activities in the course of freedom has the right of asylum within the
territories of the Republic); GRUNDGESETZ [GGI art. 16, § 2 (W. Ger.) ("politically
persecuted shall enjoy the right of asylum"). See generally Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons for
the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183 (1984) (France's and West Germany's
experiences in dealing with explosion of claims for asylum).
The United Kingdom abides by the Convention and the Protocol in providing
that "leave to enter will not be refused if removal would be contrary" to its provisions. M. SUPPERSTORE, IMMIGRATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE 84 (1983).
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1; § 138 (1980).
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opinion."
A person from El Salvador must therefore demonstrate a "wellfounded fear of being persecuted" in order to qualify as a refugee
under the Convention. 6 As a means of satisfying this requirement,
refugees from El Salvador can present extensive documentation
from numerous groups. This documentation shows that those who
express political opinions different from that of the ruling party, or
those who belong to certain social groups disfavored by the government, run a great risk of incurring physical harm or death.6
Another related and important protection expressed in the Convention is nonrefoulement6 7 By definition, this means that a refugee
should not be expelled from the country of refuge or returned to the
country of origin "where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion." 's The goal of nonrefoulement is to
prevent the expulsion of refugees to countries where the government
would persecute them. 9
The United States incorporated the principle of nonrefoulement
into the Refugee Act of 1980.70 Section 243(h) of this Act provides
that the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien to a
country if the Attorney General determines that the alien's life or
freedom would be threatened "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 7'
An important element of the Refugee Act is that the Attorney General has sole discretion to determine conditions in the alien's country.72 The courts, however, have held that the Attorney General's
64. The Convention defines a refugee as one who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. I(2)(3).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 6 for documentation from some of these groups.
67. "Nonrefoulement" means non-return. Nonrefoulement is described in article 33(1) of the Convention. Convention, supra note 63, art. 33(1). See generally
Comment, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, NonRefoulement of Refugees] (efforts of Congress to conform United States law to international tenets).
68. Id.
69. See Comment, Non-Refoulement of Refugees, supra note 67, at 357.
70. See Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981).
71. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
72. Because the Attorney General, and he alone, is able to decide if conditions
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factual findings are subject to judicial review. 78 If an alien shows
that he will face persecution if returned to his country of origin, the
Attorney General must show substantial evidence to the contrary."'
Notwithstanding provisions in United States immigration law
that provide for refuge or asylum, the current policy of the INS after catching illegal Salvadorans is to return them to El Salvador.7 5
Sanctuary workers argue convincingly that this is a clear violation of
the principle of nonrefoulement, because those returned to El Salvador face persecution.7 6 This issue, however, has only been litigated
once, and the result was unfavorable to the sanctuary member defendant. In that case, United States v. Elder,77 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the Refugee Act of 1980 fulfilled the United States' obligations under international law, and that only the Attorney General could determine if
a Salvadoran was a refugee. 7 Accordingly, defendant Elder's motion
to dismiss the indictments based on international law was dismissed.7 9 In the other major sanctuary prosecution, United States v.
Aguilar,80 the United States District Court for the District of Arizona refused to listen to arguments based on international law."1
in the alien's country are such that he would suffer persecution if forced to return,
the possibility that the decision will be a subjective one is very real. See Comment,
Non-Refoulement of Refugees, supra note 67, at 371.
73. Id. at 371-76.
74. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). This standard should be
easier to meet for aliens than the previous standard, which required that the refugee
show an abuse of discretion on the part of the INS. See Comment, Non-Refoulement
of Refugees, supra note 67, at 375. An immigration judge refused to deport McMullen
to the Republic of Ireland because McMullen would face persecution if deported.
McMullen, a former member of the Northern Ireland Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), defected and fled to the United States. Id. The immigration judge
ruled that the Republic of Ireland could not protect McMullen from the IRA. Id. The
McMullen court, however, found that the likelihood of persecution was not supported
by substantial evidence. Id. at 1319.
75. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982). See
also Illegal Immigrants-Caught in the Fine Print of American Law, REFUGEES,
June 1985, at 36, 37 (INS buys a one-way, coachfare ticket to El Salvador for each of
the 300 Salvadorans it deports each month).
76. An ACLU study found that 61 Slavadoran deportees had been murdered
after they were returned to El Salvador. Temporary Suspension of Deportation of
Certain Aliens, 1984: Hearing on H.R. 4447 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 115 (1984). Contra Zall, Asylum and Sanctuary: The American Dilemma, 72
A.B.A. J. 66, 68 (Aug. 1986).
77. 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
78. Id. at 1580-81.
79. Id. at 1581.
80. No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 1985).
81. The court granted the prosecution's motion in limine to preclude arguments
based on the free exercise of religion, refugees' rights under international law, the
defense of necessity, and the lack of specific intent to violate the immigration statutes. Id. (order granting government's motion in limine). By definition, a motion in

limine is made at the beginning of a trial.

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
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Although a defense based upon international law has not succeeded to date, the defense is viable. The United States is obligated
to follow the policy of nonrefoulement. 82 However, the process by
which the State Department or the Attorney General of the United
States determines whether conditions in an alien's country are such
that the alien would suffer persecution should he return is inherently political.8" For example, in deciding whether to grant an alien
asylum, the INS relies upon a State Department advisory opinion
'
which "correlates with foreign policy objectives." 84
Similarly, in deciding whether to withhold deportation, the Attorney General-an
executive branch official-is responsible for the decision.
In efforts to escape these political overtones, different proposals
to solve this problem of the granting of asylum or refugee status
based upon the political climate have been suggested. One proposal8" seeks to codify the definition of "persecution."" The effect of
this codification would be to reduce INS discrimination based upon
the country an alien is fleeing, and to improve judicial effectiveness. 7 A second proposal seeks to amend the definition of "refugee"
to include victims of civil strife. 88 This revised definition of refugee
would conform with recent UNHCR statements.8 9 Should either of
these proposals become law, sanctuary workers would be more successful contending that their actions comport with international law,
because most likely, the aliens would be permitted to obtain refugee
or asylee status."'
1979). In Aguilar, Judge Carroll ruled that testimony as to these defenses was irrelevant and inadmissible because it had to do with intention. No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC
(D. Ariz. 1985). See also Pacelle, supra note 52, at 97. Although the judge prohibited
discussion of the international law defense, it was mentioned at trial by a prosecution
witness. Id. at 98. See generally Colbert, supra note 20 (argues that the exclusion of
these entire defenses was not proper in Aguilar and deprived the defendants of fundamental rights).
82. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
83. See Heyman, Redefining Refugee: A Proposal for Relief for the Victims of
Civil Strife, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449 (1987).
84. Id. at 454.
85. Note, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution" in United
States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187 (1986).
86. Id. The Note argues that "foreign and domestic policy considerations" have
subordinated "United States commitments to fair and humanitarian" treatment of
aliens because of uncertaintly concerning the definition of persecution. Id. at 190.
87. Id. at 233-34.
88. Heyman, supra note 83.
89. The UNHCR stated that refugees include persons who have fled their
homelands due to internal turmoil and armed conflicts. Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 12) 16, U.N. Doc. A/40/
12 (1985).
90. In addition to relying upon international instruments such as the United
Nations Convention and the United Nations Protocol, these supporters of the movement relying on international law point also to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, signed Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). This
provides that "[elveryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
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The Doctrine of Necessity

Another defense that a defendant sanctuary worker should employ is that of necessity. One asserting this defense admits that although he committed all elements of the crime for which he is
charged, his actions are justified." The necessity defense has an extensive historical tradition in both England and the United States. 2
from persecution." Id. art. 14(1). See generally Parker, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 675 (1985) (refugees' rights under various interna-

tional law instruments).
91.

The necessity defense is one of several "choice of evils" defenses which in-

clude necessity, duress, self-defense, defense of others, and public duty. See generally
Luckstead, Choice of Evils Defenses in Texas: Necessity, Duress and Public Duty, 10
AM. J. CRIM. L. 179 (1982)(analysis of Texas cases involving choice of evils defenses).
92. See Reninger v. Fagossa, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (1551); United States v. Ashton, 24
F.Cas. 873, 874 (No. 14, 470)(C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
The defense has been codified in many state criminal codes. An example of a
typical one is Illinois,' which states:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or
private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his
own conduct.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 7-13 (1972). Most state statutes concerning the necessity
defense are based on the Model Penal Code:
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than
that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation
requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his
conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case
may be, suffices to establish culpability.
MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 3.02 (Official Draft 1985).

The necessity defense traditionally has been invoked in cases of prison escapes.
See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974)(necessity is a limited defense to an escape charge); People v. Unger, 66 I1. 2d 333, 362
N.E.2d 319 (1977)(necessity defense may be raised in cases of prison escapes). See
generally Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from
Prison-A Step Towards IncarcerationFree From Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
110 (1975)(history of the use of the necessity defense in cases of prison escapes).
In addition, the defense was asserted in a case involving a fire in San Francisco,
when a public officer ordered houses destroyed to stop the spread of the fire and one
homeowner sued him. Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853). The court found his action
proper, quoting the maxim: "Necessitas inducit privilegium qoud jura private [Necessity leads to privileges because it is private justice]. Id. at 73. Accord Cope v.
Sharpe, [1912] 1 K.B. 496 (necessity defense available to defendant, who burned
plaintiff's land in order to stop spread of fire).
The defense was invoked unsuccessfully in the "lifeboat" cases. See, e.g., Regina
v. Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884)(two men adrift in a lifeboat who ate
dying boy could not assert necessity defense).
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The defense of necessity has four elements.9 The first element
is the balance of harms test: the defendant must show that the harm
he or she sought to stop outweighs the harm of his or her act.94 Second, the defendant must not possess another legal alternative.95 The
third element requires that the defendant acted to avoid an imminent danger.9 " Finally, the defendant must show a direct causal relationship between his or her actions and the threatened danger.97
The necessity defense has recently been asserted in cases involving antiwar protesters and antinuclear protesters.98 It has prevailed in a few cases involving antinuclear protests.9 9 None of the
93.
94.

See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430-34 (9th Cir. 1985).
This test has been defined as a situation in which "a person is faced with a

choice of two evils and must then decide whether to commit a crime or an alternative
act that constitutes a greater evil." United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691,
695 (9th Cir. 1984).
95. Dorrell, 758 F.2d at 431. In Dorrell, the court held that the antinuclear
protesters who were on trial had other legal alternatives available to them, specifically
the use of the political processes. Id. at 432 ("defendant's failure to resort to the
political process precludes the assertion of the necessity defense to charges arising
from political processes").
96. See People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1981)(cult
deprogrammer denied necessity instruction in kidnapping case because no proof of
imminent danger of physical harm to cult member). Accord State v. Marley, 54 Haw.
450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973)(criminal trespasser at plant manufacturing weapons not

entitled to necessity defense because danger not imminent). "Imminent" is defined as
near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impending;
on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (5th ed. 1979). This danger must not be debatable or speculative. See Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 694.
97. Darrell, 758 F.2d at 433. The key is whether the defendant's belief is truly
reasonable, Id. In Dorrell, which involved a prosecution of nuclear activists who trespassed at a submarine base, the court stated: "Here, Dorrell failed as a matter of law
to establish that his entry into Vandenburg and his spray-painting of government
property could reasonably be anticipated to lead to the termination of the MX missile program and the aversion of nuclear war and world starvation." Id.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972). In this
case, where Vietnam War protesters entered a Selective Service Office and removed
draft cards, the court held that the defendants' actions were not done in order to
avoid a specific harm, but to change the government policy. Id. at 698-701. See also
United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984)(defendant convicted of entering military property asserted necessity defense, but court held he had reasonable
alternatives to violating the law and defense not valid).
99. E.g., People v. Jarka, No. 002170 (Lake Cty, Ill. Ct., Apr. 1985)(jury found
defendants not guilty of trespassing after they blockaded Great Lakes Naval Training
Center). Cf. State v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 CnCr (Chittenden Cir. Dist. Ct. Vt. Nov.,
1984)(jury found 44 people not guilty of trespassing after they remained in a Vermont
Senator's office to persuade him to vote against military aid to El Salvador). See
generally Aldridge & Stark, Nuclear War, Citizen Intervention, and the Necessity
Defense, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1986)(discussing how elements of necessity
defense are satisfied in cases involving antinuclear protesters); Necessity Defense
Comes of Age, 4 CAL. LAW. 20 (Mar. 1984)(California cases involving antinuclear
protesters); Note, The State Made Me Do It; The Applicability of the Necessity
Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN.L. REV. 1173 (1987)(argues that this defense
undermines the legitimacy of civil disobedience); Note, Justification Defense by Antinuclear Demonstrators, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 643 (1986)(discusses Pennsylvania an-
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Sanctuary Movement defendants, however, have asserted the necessity defense.100 Such defendants should employ this defense because
the actions of the sanctuary members satisfy all four elements of
this defense.
First, the harm the workers are doing-breaking immigration
laws-is outweighed by the harm they are seeking to avert-returning aliens to El Salvador. Those returned face imprisonment or
worse fates."0 ' Second, no other reasonable legal alternative exists
for the sanctuary member.'0 2 The political process-attempting to
change the refugee laws-is sluggish, and will not help those who
seek immediate refuge. Third, sanctuary members are acting to
avert an imminent harm. The imminent harm is that the aliens will
find no refuge in the United States, and that the government will
deport them back to El Salvador to face bleak futures. Fourth, a
causal relationship exists between the sanctuary workers' actions
and the threatened harm. Their actions help save the lives of the
refugees, and may help change United States refugee policy.' 0 3
The necessity defense, therefore, is a viable defense for sanctuary workers charged with violating United States immigration law.
Although no sanctuary cases to date have successfully asserted this
defense, it should nevertheless be argued. Not only is there a possibility that it will prevail, but presenting the arguments in court will
publicize the cause and educate the American public.
C.

Free Exercise of Religion

Sanctuary workers contend that the Free Exercise Clause of the
tinuclear cases involving necessity defense); Low, Appellate Court Refects Necessity
Defense in Nuclear Protests, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 20, col. 2 (5,000 demonstrators have been arrested at California nuclear sites in past six years).
Where the defense has failed, the courts have held that adequate means existed
to fight the danger the defendant was protesting. See United States v. Seward, 687
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom. Ahrendt v. United States, 459 U.S.
1147 (1983). Accord In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1985). They
have also found that no causal relationship existed between the defendant's actions
and halting the danger. See United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1979). In
Cassidy, defendants were convicted of destruction of government property after they
threw blood and ashes on the Pentagon's walls and ceilings. Id. The Court held that
this action would not bring about an end to nuclear war. Id. at 102.
100. In Aguilar, the judge ordered that the defense of necessity could not be
argued. No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 1985). See supra note 81.
101. See supra note 76.
102. Contra Schmidt, Refuge in the United States: The Sanctuary Movement
Should Use the Legal System, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79 (1986)(argues that alternatives
include providing legal assistance and bond to those raising claims, bringing lawsuits
against the government, and passing sanctuary cities' resolutions).
103. United States history abounds with examples of illegal actions which have
changed United States policies, such as the Boston Tea Party, the Underground Railroad, the civil rights movement, and the antiwar movement.
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Constitution protects their actions.104 The Free Exercise Clause, although broadly stated, is not unlimited. Sanctuary workers maintain
that their actions fall within the clause's boundaries. 0 5 They emphasize that a worker's right to offer sanctuary is more important
than the government's interest in protecting society's health, safety,
and morals.' 06
The Supreme Court enunciated the modern test used in deter07
mining the validity of a free exercise claim in Sherbert v. Verner.1
In Sherbert, the Court invalidated a state law which denied unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist who could not
find employment due to her refusal to work on Saturdays.'0 " Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, articulated an "alternate means"
test which first asks whether the state action imposes a burden on
the person's religion. 0' If so, the Court then asks whether the government has a "compelling" interest that requires the infringement." 0 If the government does satisfy the "compelling interest" requirement, it must then prove that no feasible alternate means
exists by which the state could achieve its purpose."' The Supreme
Court subsequently held that the state must grant an exemption to
those whose free exercise of religion is burdened if the state's goals
2
will still be substantially achieved."
The Court has found that certain activities enjoy the free exercise claim. Among these activities are the right of conscientious objection from military service for those whose belief in a Supreme
Being is sincere and meaningful." s The Court has held that the conscientious objection protection does not exempt merely those who
believe in God, but also "exempts from military service all those
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give no rest or peace if they allowed themselves
to become part of an instrument of war."" 4 Other activities which
have been protected under the free exercise claim include the right
104. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

...
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

105. See, e.g., Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1516.
106. Id.
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 406.
110. Id.
111. Id. In Sherbert, the Court for the first time affirmed a duty to balance the
harm to one's freedom of conscience against the danger to a state's legislative freedom. See also Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327,
329 (1969).
112. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
113. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
114. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). The right to conscientious objection, however, was held not to apply to people who objected only to the
Vietnam War and not all wars. E.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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of sabbatarians to work11 5 and the Amish people's desire to limit the
education of their children to an eighth-grade level.116 Under these
decisions, sanctuary members asserting the freedom of religion defense have a valid argument. Applying the analysis from Sherbert"'
and Wisconsin v. Yoder," s the sanctuary workers contend that
under their religious beliefs, they are compelled to offer sanctuary to
those in need. 1 9 As a result, the immigration laws burden this religious expression. 20 In response, the government contends that its
interest in enforcing federal immigration policy is compelling. 1 The
workers argue, however, that the government could still substantially achieve its immigration goals if it granted an exemption to the
workers. 2 '
This free exercise of religion argument was presented in United
States v. Elder,"'2 one of the two sanctuary prosecutions to date. In
Elder, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
115. The Supreme Court has held that a sabbatarian employee was entitled to
unemployment payments despite being unable to accept a job which included Saturday work. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. Additionally, the Court has found that a Jehovah's Witness, a sabbatarian, could not be denied unemployment payments for refusing work in a weapons plant, an activity in opposition to his religious tenets. Thomas
v. Review Bd. Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
116. The Court has granted an exemption to the Amish people, holding that
they need not comply with Wisconsin's compulsory education law. See Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
The Court, however has neglected to protect the activities of many others who
have asserted the freedom of religion defense. The Court has found the state's interest in promoting monogamy to be more important than the defendants' free exercise
right. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878). Similarly,
mandatory participation in the Social Security system was more important than the
defendant's free exercise claim. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982).
Recently, a court held that the free exercise claim of individuals who damaged a B-52
bomber as a form of protest against nuclear war was not as fundamental as the state's
interest in protecting government property. United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d
Cir. 1985). Defendants contended that the Bible not only directs them not to kill, but
also to act affirmatively to prevent killing and war. Id. at 452. The court, however,
found that no Supreme Court case supported the destruction of another's property
based on free exercise of religion grounds: "[N]o plausible argument can be advanced
why the Government must accommodate the religious beliefs of those who would destroy government property." Id. at 452-53.
117. 374 U.S. 398 (1961).
118. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
119. Elder, 601 F. Supp, 1574.
120. Id.
121. The goal of immigration control "is to prevent entry by enemies of the
state, criminals, and other classifications of immigrants which Congress determines to
be undesirable." Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1579.
122. The Sanctuary Movement to date has provided safe haven for only a small
number of Salvadoran refugees. See Goldman, supra note 8, at 4; Ridgeway, supra
note 8, at 4. This number is insignificant when compared with the number of
Salvadorans illegally in the United States: it is between 0.2% and 0.3% of the total.
See supra note 23 for figures on Salvadorans in the United States.
123. 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985). In Aguilar, the judge ruled that arguments based on the free exercise of religion could not be presented. No. CR-85-008PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 1985). See supra note 81 for a discussion of this in limine ruling.
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Texas found that the defendant met the initial burden of demonstrating that religious beliefs motivated his actions in providing
sanctuary.1 24 The court relied first, upon the testimony of several
Christian clergy who affirmed that Elder's commitment to aid those
in need is a "fundamental aspect of Christianity," and second, upon
the testimony of the brutal conditions in El Salvador.125
The court then held that the government met its burden of
showing a compelling state interest. 2 The court found that the
state's interest in controlling immigration was "inherent in sovereignty" and "vital to the welfare and security of the people."' 27 The
court
next considered whether an alternate means of enforcing the
government's
interest existed. It reasoned that if the government
took into account Elder's religious beliefs, the result would be a "do
it yourself" immigration policy. 26 Additionally, the Elder court

speculated that a judgment in Elder's favor would open2 9 up the
American border to an influx of the world's unfortunates.1
Despite the Elder court's pronouncement to the contrary, the
free exercise of religion argument is a viable defense for sanctuary
workers. First, the court's speculation that United States immigration policy would become chaotic if sanctuary workers are not convicted is not based on a careful reading of the freedom of religion
cases. Second, an exemption granted to sanctuary workers would
still achieve the immigration laws' goals and would further United
States humanitarian policies. Therefore, the argument based on free
exercise of religion should be vigorously asserted.
The Elder court's reasoning was flawed because it stemmed
from a fear that upholding Elder's right to engage in the Sanctuary
Movement, despite violation of the criminal harboring and transporting statute, would result in other citizens who wished to help
124. "He is a Roman Catholic who feels a charitable Christian commitment,
founded in the Gospel, which motivates him to assist those who flee the violence in El
Salvador." Elder, 601 F. Supp at 1577.
125. Id. at 1577-78. Clergy testifying for Elder included the Roman Catholic
Bishop of the Brownsville, Texas diocese; and American Baptist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and United Methodist ministers. Id. at 1577.
126. Id. at 1578-79.
127. Id. at 1578. The court emphasized the limited role the judiciary should
play in immigration matters, and that Congress' power over aliens' admissions is paramount. Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)(quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))).
128. Id. at 1579. The court stated that Elder was giving away that which was
not his to give away. Id. at 1578. Compare I. BAu, THis GROUND Is HOLY 180
(1985)(individual citizens implementing their own asylum sustem is beneficial) with
Schmidt, supra note 102, at 95.
129. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1579 (others "may conclude that the starving and
impoverished of North Africa, Asia, or Mexico are equally entitled to enter this country without review by the INS").
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aliens from other oppressive countries, making similar claims.'3 0 The
Yoder Court's opinion,' 3' however, the controlling precedent on the
Free Excercise Clause, did not reach this conclusion. In Yoder, the
Court concluded that the defendant had the right to practice his
Amish religion and to not comply with compulsory state education
laws."'2 In other words, the individual defendant did not have to
abide by the laws. Therefore, under Yoder, each individual sanctuary defendant would have to prove his or her free exercise claim.
Because the courts do not rule invariably in favor of those asserting
this defense, this defense would not cause the floodgates to open and
refugees to pour into the United States' borders.1 3 3 The Elder
court's conclusion, therefore, is simplistic and fails to balance important societal interests with resolvable prudential concerns.
The second reason the free exercise of religion defense is viable
is because granting an exemption to sanctuary workers will still
achieve immigration goals, and will at the same time, further American humanitarian policies. The Sanctuary Movement provides safe
haven for only a handful of Salvadorans in the United States. 34 An
action affecting such a small number of aliens cannot be responsible
for causing the United States' immigration policy to deteriorate.
Additionally, granting an exemption to the sanctuary workers
will further the United States' humanitarian policies. In 1939, a bill
pending in Congress would have saved 20,000 children from the Nazis, but it was defeated.'3 5 Yet traditionally, as symbolized by the
Statue of Liberty, the United States has been the country to provide
refuge to foreigners. This tradition began with its very origins as a
country. The mistake of not providing refuge for the children in
1939 should not be repeated now.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At present, the Sanctuary Movement, while yet to score a decisive victory in court, has succeeded in educating ihe American public about the problems faced by Salvadoran aliens.s At the next
130. Id.
131. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
132. Id.
133. See supra note 116 for examples of when the courts have rejected this
argument.
134. See supra note 122 for a discussion of the percentage of Salvadorans
helped by the Sanctuary Movement.
135. S.J. Res. 64 & H.R.J. Res 168, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
136. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
movement has grown. The movement has drawn extended press coverage. See, e.g.,
The Sanctuary Case, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 30, 1985, at 4, col. 1 ("[Tlhe Sanctuary trial is
consistent with current U.S. [immigration] policy. It, too, is a sham"). Additionally,
Congress has taken notice of the problem. On Oct. 9, 1986, the House of Representa-
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trial of sanctuary members, a vigorous defense based on international law, necessity, and the free exercise of religion may defend
those who help the sojourners among us, such as the Sanchezes of El
Salvador. 187
Barbara A. Sherry

tives, in an immigration reform bill, voted 199-197 to temporarily prohibit the United
States from deporting Salvadoran and Nicaraguan aliens seeking asylum. See Drew,
Immigration Bill Passes- With a Catch, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 10, 1986, 1, at 1, col.
2. On Oct. 14, 1986, however, the House of Representatives and the Senate hammered
out a deal, in which the House sanctuary proposal was dropped, because of the fear of
a Presidential veto. Drew, Deal on Immigration Reform, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 15,
1986, 1, at 1, col. 2. Thus, the most recent attempt to reform immigration policy
leaves sanctuary workers, and the aliens they help, in no better position than in the
past. Immigration laws are still such that a striking resemblance exists between "King
Minos's Labyrinth in ancient Crete . . . and the Immigration and Nationality Act."
Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
137. Lazarus, The New Colussus, in J. HARRIS, A STATUE FOR AMERICA 88
(1985), quoted in Anaya, Sanctuary: Because There Are Still Many Who Wait for
Death, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 114 (1986) (article by former Governor of New Mexico, who declared his state a sanctuary).

